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Abstract   A discrete time, multi-gear, and age structured bio-economic model
is developed for the East Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, a paradigmatic example
of the difficulties faced in managing highly migratory fish stocks. The model is
used to analyse alternative management strategies for the Regional Fisheries
Management Organisation (RFMO) managing this fishery, and to investigate
some of the policy implications. For the various scenarios, the optimal stock
level varies between 500–800,000 tonnes, which compares with a stock level of
150,000 tonnes in 1995. In other words, there is a very strong case for rebuilding
the stock. Moreover, the sustainability of the stock is threatened unless a recovery
programme is implemented; indeed, the alternative may be stock collapse. Second,
to rebuild the stock, Draconian measures are called for: either outright morato-
ria over fairly lengthy periods, or possibly a more gradual approach to steady
state given by a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) at a low level for an extended pe-
riod of time. Third, the cost of inefficient gear structure is very high indeed.
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JEL Classification Code   Q22.
Introduction
Straddling and highly migratory fish stocks pose formidable management problems.
Cases of severely depleted stocks are well known, due mostly to perverse economic
incentives and inefficient regulations. One example is given by the East Atlantic
bluefin tuna, a highly migratory species. Until now, this fishery has essentially been
open access and, as a consequence, the stock has been severely overexploited with
the distinct possibility of stock collapse (Brasão, Costa-Duarte, and Cunha-e-Sá
2000). Yet, several countries, both coastal and distant water fishing nations, consider
entering this fishery because of the high market value of the tuna. The decline in
bluefin tuna stock to the extent where it is almost an endangered species, and where
there have been calls for its trade to be regulated by the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (Martinez-Garmendia and Anderson 2005), has raised
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considerable concern about its management. The highly migratory nature of the re-
source, combined with a large number of actual and potential players as well as
ineffective management, makes it a difficult management problem. Yet, improved
management bears the promise of very beneficial consequences in terms of substan-
tial economic rents.
According to the Law of the Sea, the high seas beyond 200-mile Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones (EEZs) were considered to be international common property open to
all nations. The many conflicts between fishing nations and the severe depletion of
many straddling and highly migratory stocks proved the inadequacy of this legal set-
ting to deal with the sustainable management of these stocks (Munro 1999).
According to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, coastal countries and distant water
fishing nations should cooperate in the management of straddling and highly migra-
tory fish stocks, to be carried out through RFMOs, with the objective of long-term
sustainability of the stocks (UN 1995). The success of RFMOs in terms of managing
highly migratory fish stocks remains to be seen.
A discrete time, multi-gear, and age structured bio-economic model is devel-
oped for the East Atlantic bluefin tuna. The objective is to analyse alternative
management strategies and their policy implications that could be taken as guide-
lines by an RFMO managing this fishery. In this context, the optimal stock level is
determined as well as an investment (recovery) path for the resource. Given that
bluefin tuna is harvested by several different gears that target different age classes,
as well as by a number of different countries, the impact of the harvest on the stock
will depend on the combination of technologies (gear types) used and the countries
participating in the fishery. For this reason, a number of different scenarios will be
analysed. However, non-constant harvesting strategies will be formulated. To our
knowledge, such a flexible approach has not previously been employed in the analy-
sis of the management of Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, a brief description of the
East Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is presented. In the third section, the bioeconomic
model, consisting of a model of population dynamics and an economic model, is de-
veloped. Optimal management is examined in the fourth section, while the
concluding section discusses policy implications.
The East Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fishery
The Northern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) i  a large
oceanic pelagic fish and is the largest of the tunas. It can grow to a length of over
two metres and weigh more than 500 kg; the largest bluefin tuna recorded was 679
kg (Ono 2004). Bluefin tunas can live up to 25 years. They are opportunistic feed-
ers, commonly feeding on other fish and squid. Like other tunas, the bluefin tends to
be found in schools of similar-sized individuals.
In 1982, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) established a dividing line between the East and West Atlantic, separating
the stocks in order to facilitate stock assessment. The two existing stocks tend to mi-
grate within their own area. Although there is a certain amount of mixing between
stocks, they are managed separately, allowing us to focus exclusively on the eastern
stock. The two stocks are also managed separately by ICCAT.
The eastern stock is distributed from the east of the Canary Islands to Norway,
in the North Sea, in Ireland, in the entire Mediterranean Sea, and in the southern
Black Sea. Occasionally, it goes to Iceland and Murmansk. Bluefin tuna move ac-
cording to food abundance and water temperature. Spawning is located in the warm
waters (around 24ºC) of the Mediterranean around the Balearic Islands and in the
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south of the Tyrrhenian Sea, starting in June and continuing until July. In the begin-
ning of this season, a great flow of bluefin tunas can be observed. Afterwards, some
specimens remain in the Mediterranean throughout the year, and others, either
young or adult, leave these waters and go to Morocco, the Viscaya Gulf, the Canary
Islands, and the Madeira Islands. The larger bluefin tuna can be found in the North
Sea and along the Norwegian coast, since they are more resistant to colder waters.
In winter they return to the tempered waters of the African coast.
Catch and Stock Development
Bluefin tuna is the most valuable fish in the ocean. High-quality tuna fetches a price
premium in the Japanese sashimi market, where a single fish can command a price
of up to US$100,000 (Dalton 2005, see also Martinez-Garmendia and Anderson
2005). Moreover, price has been increasing in recent years due to a worldwide de-
cline in catches of high-quality tuna. Prices vary substantially with different gear
types and over the season, due to variations in fish quality, size, and fat content
(Martinez-Garmendia and Anderson 2005).
Bluefin tuna fisheries are characterised by a variety of vessel types and fishing
gears operating from many countries. Different circumstances—economic, biologi-
cal, geographical, and political—dictate the choice of gear type. The traditional and
most important gear types in the East Atlantic are the purse seine, longline, trap, and
bait boat. The purse seine is a huge net that is cast into the sea, gathering fish in its
sweep. Generally, the fish caught are of medium size and weigh about 150 kg. When
the net is hauled up, the fishermen jump into the water and beat the tunas to death
with a stick rendering a very stressed and damaged catch. As a consequence, their
price is about US$9 per kg (see table 1 for average prices for the different gears).
The longline consists of a cable to which smaller independent cables are attached at
intervals of several metres. These smaller cables carry numerous hooks. With this
gear the fish die slowly, reducing the stress involved and, therefore, yielding a
higher price of US$17 per kg. The trap is a kind of labyrinth created in the sea that
leads the fish to an area where they remain until they are taken at convenience. The
bluefin tuna attracted to these areas are generally large spawners, and at the time of
harvest they do not suffer stress and are not damaged. Therefore, the quality is very
high and a premium price is fetched—an average of US$25 per kg. The bait boat
catches the fish using live bait and fishing rods. The fish caught are smaller since
the strength of the fishermen is required to land the catch. As a consequence, the
Table 1
Economic Parameters of the Model—1995 Values
Price (P) Cost (c) per
Gear (US$/kg) Unit of Effort (US$) Unit of Effort
Longline 17 14,102 Fishing days
Purse Seine1 9 45,185 Fishing days
Trap 25 15,738 Trap days
Bait Boat 5 4,638 Days at sea
Remainder 17 2,408 Days at sea
Note: 1 For the purse seine, one fishing day corresponds to more than three days at sea.
Source: Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte (2002).
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price is low—US$5 per kg. In addition, a number of other minor gears participate in
the fishery; as a catchall we call them “remainder.”
Throughout the years, the importance of each gear type has changed. Certain
fisheries, such as trap, go back to ancient times. Other gear types, such as the
longline and the Mediterranean purse seine, reached full development in the mid-
1970s. The spatial distribution of the different gears has changed through the years.
The most important change in this respect has been the relocation of the longline
fishery to latitudes above 40º and longitudes between 20º and 50º west; i.e., to fish-
ing grounds on the high seas outside coastal state 200-mile EEZs.
Historically, more than 50 countries have participated in the fishery for bluefin
tuna; currently, 25–30 participate. European countries such as Italy, France, and
Spain use bait boat, longline, purse seine, and trap. Distant water fishing nations
(DWFNs), such as Japan, come to the high seas of the North Atlantic to catch blue-
fin tuna using longline. In the 1970s, annual catches varied between 10,500 tonnes
in 1970 and 22,300 tonnes in 1976 (figure 1). Subsequently, catches increased and
reached a maximum of 52,737 tonnes in 1997. Thereafter, there was a decrease to
30,000 tonnes in 2000, mainly due to lower stock levels.
Stock size decreased from 210,000 tonnes in 1971 to 133,000 tonnes in 1981
(figure 1). Thereafter, stock remained fairly stable, experiencing a slight increase in
1993–94; in 2000 it was at roughly the same level of 150,000 tonnes.
The situation is very grave. If the current trend is maintained, a complete stock
collapse is expected (Brasão, Costa-Duarte, and Cunha-e-Sá 2000). Already the trap
fishery off Sicily, a mainstay of the island’s economy since the Middle Ages, is fac-
ing extinction (Owen 2003). It may seem paradoxical that the most profitable
fishery, trap, will become extinct first. This is because tuna may simply disappear
from the waters where the trap fishery takes place, rather than due to the fishery be-
coming unprofitable in the more traditional understanding of the term.
Figure 1.  Bluefin Tuna Catches and Stock Evolution in the East
Atlantic (including the Mediterranean Sea)
Source: ICCAT.
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Tuna farming has also become fairly widespread in the Mediterranean. How-
ever, unlike aquaculture, where fish are bred and reared in captivity, tuna farming is
based on juvenile fish captured in the wild that are reared to market size and then
exported, mainly to Japan for “sushi” consumption. This tuna farming, which has
been subsidised by the EU, has put the stock under even greater pressure.1
The lower number of participants in the fishery is primarily due to reduced
stock levels as compared to historical figures. This has been compounded by the fact
that as the stock declines, the distribution area of the stock is reduced, which ex-
plains why countries like Norway, Iceland, and Russia are not currently active in the
fishery. Nevertheless, the situation points to a potential threat to the stock; if and
when the stock recovers, there are many potential entrants. This is compounded by
the high value of the fish. Therefore, as the stock increases, so will fishing pressure.
Thus, the success of a recovery programme critically depends on compliance with
regulations; in particular, control of harvests and of (new) entrants to the fishery.
Management
Bluefin tuna is classified as a highly migratory fish stock. According to the 1995
UN Fish Stocks Agreement,2 both coastal states and high-seas fishing states are re-
quired to cooperate directly or through the establishment of sub-RFMOs or RFMOs
to this end (UN 1995). Such cooperation is intended to ensure the long-term sustain-
able exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Participation in an
RFMO is open to all countries having a “real” interest in the relevant fishery.3
The management of the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna is the responsibility of
ICCAT. ICCAT was established in 1969 with two main functions: to provide scien-
tific assessments of Atlantic tunas and tuna-like fish and to give management
recommendations that will permit a sustainable fishery. At present, there are 23 con-
tracting parties to ICCAT. These include coastal states in Europe and Africa as well
as DWFNs such as Korea and Japan.
As early as 1974, ICCAT recommended limiting the bluefin tuna catch in both
the Atlantic and Mediterranean. In spite of the recommendations being officially
implemented in 1975, they had no or little impact, as they were not respected.
Present regulations include catch limits (quotas for each member country), prohibi-
tion of juvenile landings, and closed seasons (no longlining in the Mediterranean in
June-July by vessels of more than 24 metres) (ICCAT 1998). So far, the regulations
have proved to be rather ineffective. This is due to the inability of ICCAT to monitor
and enforce its regulations, which is compounded by the large number of partici-
pants in the fishery, members as well as non-members of ICCAT.
The Bio-economic Model
A bio-economic model consisting of a model of population dynamics and an eco-
nomic model is developed to analyse the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. The
model is programmed in Matlab as a non-linear equation system to be solved for
each time period. The simulation chooses TAC quotas and the best combination of
1 www.wwf.org.uk/news/scotland/n_0000000518.asp
2 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement has recently acquired the status of international treaty law.
3 See Bjørndal and Munro (2003) on the management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks.
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gear types in order to maximise the net present value from the fisheries. The
optimisation process is time consuming and several attempts may be necessary in
order to achieve convergence (Kennedy 1992).4
The Model of Population Dynamics
The model of population dynamics for the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna consists of
an age-structured, multi-gear, discrete time model, which was developed by
Kirkwood and Barry (1997). The model, which is presented in the appendix, is
solved for each of 60 time periods (years). An interesting feature of the model is that
a non-linear system of S = 5 (number of gear types) equations is solved for each
time period. The stock is composed of 10 different age classes. A model as complex
as this one is necessary to account for the number of sub-fisheries involved, repre-
senting different technologies and the year-class structure of the stock.
In this model, recruitment is assumed to occur at discrete time intervals. More-
over, recruits will normally join the parent population one year after spawning. This
approach has been used in several applied studies; e.g., for North Sea herring, as in
Bjørndal (1988).
We will first examine stock evolution under natural conditions; i.e., in the ab-
sence of harvesting. This will be done by simulating the model for base case
parameters (see appendix). The period up to 2100 is considered. As we can see from
figure 2, the total biomass increases until approximately 2040 and stabilises thereaf-
ter at a steady-state level—the carrying capacity of the environment—of about
1,200,000 tonnes.
Based on simulations of the model, we can develop a growth function, which is
plotted in figure 3. As expected, the higher the biomass level, the lower the biomass
growth. Growth falls to zero when the stock reaches the carrying capacity of the en-
vironment.
Growth rate is not monotonically decreasing in stock size. For some levels of
stock size, the growth rate is constant or even increasing. This can be explained by
the recruitment function considered and the initial age class composition of the
stock. For the given recruitment function, which is a bilinear relationship,5 and the
initial composition of the stock, we observe that from year to year the number of
fish increases in most instances, while in some cases it decreases. This explains the
curvature of the growth rate. If, on the other hand, the steady state represented the
initial age composition, then relative growth would be monotonously declining in
stock size, as expected.
The Economic Model
In the model, five different gear types, s = 1, …, 5, are considered: the longline
(LL), the purse seine (PS), the trap, the bait boat (BB), and the remainder. The eco-
nomic model is set out in equations 1–5:
4 Some simulations took a week to perform due to the fact that the bioeconomic model incorporates dif-
ferent age groups, several gears, and is solved for many years. For each simulation, several initial values
were tested in order to guarantee that the results did not depend on the starting point. The range of the
initial values tested was extensive, so the optimisation results can be considered as being applicable glo-
bally rather than locally.
5 The recruitment function is taken from Kirkwood and Barry (1997), who estimated various functional
forms with the bilinear giving the best fit.
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Figure 2.  Biomass Evolution with no Catches
Figure 3.  Growth Function for Bluefin Tuna
Note: The growth rate is defined as [B(t) – B(t – 1)]/B(t – 1),
where B(t) represents the total biomass, and t is the time period.
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Re vt,s is the revenue per gear type s in time t, Ps is the price per gear type, g is the
crew share per gear type, Ct,s is the catch per gear type in time t, qs is the
catchability coefficient per gear type, Et,s is the effort by gear type s in year t, Bt is
stock size in year t, Costt,s is the cost per gear, cs is the unit cost parameter for gear
type s, P t,s is profits per gear type s in year t, TNPV is the TNPV of the fishery, and
r is the discount rate.
For the revenue function (equation [1]), an average price per gear type is used. It is
common practise in many fisheries that the crew receive a share (g) of revenues, while
(1 – g) is the share of revenue received by the boat owner. This is also the case with
the bluefin tuna fishery, where the share of the crew in revenues is 0.3; i. ., g = 0.3.6
The link between the model of population dynamics and the economic model is
established through equation (2), which gives the harvest function. Harvest (C) is a
function of the catchability coefficient, qs, which varies with gear type,7 effort (E)
and stock size (B). When modelling the harvest of bluefin tuna, a harvest function
where the stock-output elasticity (a) s less than one is considered. This type of pro-
duction function is frequently used for schooling species (e.g., Bjørndal 1988;
Kennedy 1992). In the bluefin tuna fishery there are gear types that use very ad-
vanced methods of detection. For these gear types—longline, bait boat, and purse
seine—whose catches do not depend much on the existing stock, a low stock-output
elasticity of 0.2 is assumed. For the more traditional gear types, trap and remainder,
which are more stock dependent, the value is assumed to be 0.8. This means that
harvesting by some of the most important gears is quite unresponsive to changes in
stock size. A consequence of this is that the stock is very vulnerable to depletion un-
der an open-access regime (Bjørndal 1988; Brasão, Costa-Duarte, and Cunha-e-Sá
2000).
For the cost function (equation [3]), we adopted a function where total cost by
gear type is a linear function of the level of fishing effort. Fishing effort for the vari-
ous gear types is defined in table 1, which also gives cost per unit effort. Fixed costs
were not considered since most fleets also target other species. Thus, in this model
formulation, marginal cost of effort is constant for each gear type. Nevertheless, the
cost per unit harvested will vary for different stock levels due to the stock-output
6 Ideally, the opportunity cost of labour should have been used, but due to the complexity of the model
and data availability, this was not feasible.
7 The value of this variable was obtained by solving the production function in order to find qs, applying
the base year values for catches, biomass, and total effort (those for 1995). Econometric estimation was
not possible due to lack of data.
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elasticity. Moreover, these costs will vary among gear types, due to different mar-
ginal costs and different stock-output elasticities.
Profits are given by equation (4). The sum of the net present values for all gear
types gives the total net present value (TNPV) (equation [5]).
Optimal Management
We now examine the optimal pattern of catches that maximises the TNPV of the
fishery; i.e., equation (5), subject to the model of population dynamics and other
constraints, as specified below. The optimisation process was conducted in the fol-
lowing way: a grid was established for different combinations of starting values for
the TAC for each gear type. The different paths were then simulated, the net present
values were estimated and ranked, and the highest one chosen. The net present value
was the same for numerous starting values for the TAC so that a global optimum
was obtained.
Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte (2002) analysed how constant effort and constant
TAC policies could improve the economic performance of bluefin tuna fisheries over an
open-access fishery for a 25-year period. These assumptions impose severe constraints
on the solution. Therefore, the current analysis goes beyond that by investigating non-
constant optimising strategies over a 60-year period, a period that is sufficient for the
stock to attain a steady state. Moreover, a number of alternative scenarios for future
management will be analysed based on important characteristics of the fishery.
Presently, this fishery has five different main gear types. In the first scenario,
we assume this will be the case also for the future and impose it as a restriction on
optimisation; in particular, we assume that the share of catch for the different gear
types is the same as in 1995. As an alternative, we consider a flexible gear structure
in order to see whether these five gear types are in fact the most efficient combina-
tion. In this optimisation, we still impose constraints on some of the gears’ catches.
According to historical data, the trap has never harvested more than 10,000 tonnes,
and the remainder has always stayed below 5,000 tonnes per year. Trap is the most
profitable gear (table 1). With a flexible gear structure, one would expect it to out-
perform the other gears. However, as there are biological and technological
constraints on its expansion and the gear can be used only in certain geographical
locations (above), the upper limit imposed is reasonable. As mentioned, remainder
consists of a diversity of different gears; an expansion beyond what has been ob-
served historically is most unlikely.
Initially, we thus consider two scenarios:
A1. The status quo fleet—a constant relative gear type structure as of 1995,
where all current gear types remain in the fishery.8
B1. A flexible gear structure, consisting of the most efficient gear types,
with upper limits on the harvests by trap and remainder.
The discount rate is set at 4% in all scenarios.9
Initial stock size is at a low level (figure 1). An optimal programme may, there-
8 In 1995, the shares of the different gear types in catches were: longline 0.321, purse seine 0.4419, trap
0.0464, bait boat 0.0819, and remainder 0.1087.
9 This is in accordance with other applied studies, using similar investment horizons, such as the US De-
partment of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service (1995) and long-run interest rates published
in reports from the International Monetary Fund.
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fore, involve an initial and possibly lengthy moratorium of the fishery (Clark 1985).
This policy may appear to be rather Draconian. Therefore, as an alternative to sce-
narios A1 and B1, we impose a constraint on each scenario that catches in any given
year may not be less than 10,000 tonnes. We denote these alternatives as scenarios
A2 and B2, respectively. Optimisation results for the four scenarios specified are
given in table 2.
The TNPV results show that in fact the initial gear structure (scenario A1) is not
optimal. Indeed, optimality implies that two gears should be shut down; namely, bait
boat and purse seine (scenario B1); this would increase TNPV from US$937 million
to US$3,040 million.
The stock and catch evolution for scenario A1 is shown in figure 4. Interest-
ingly, it gives rise to pulse fishing (Clark 1985). There is a moratorium for the first
10 years, followed by fishing for 13 years, then a further moratorium of five years,
etc. In other words, the cycle is 13 years of fishing followed by a five-year morato-
rium.
During the moratorium, the stock increases to a level of about 800,000 tonnes.
As fishing commences, stock size is gradually reduced to a level of 499,500 tonnes
at the point when the new moratorium is imposed. During fishing periods, harvest is
55,000 tonnes. This outcome can be explained by the fact that purse seine and bait
boat target young bluefin tuna, with consequent effects on the stock age structure.
In scenario B1, the pattern of catches is characterised by a 13-year moratorium
for longline, a three-year moratorium for trap, and a four-year moratorium for re-
mainder. Thereafter, longline attains 35,000 tonnes, trap 10,000 tonnes, and
remainder 5,000 tonnes; i. ., a total annual harvest of 50,000 tonnes. The brief
moratorium period declared for the trap is explained by the high profitability of this
gear type followed by remainder, which has the second highest profitability.
Table 2
Comparison of Alternative Management Scenarios—4% Discount Rate
Scenario A2: Scenario B1: Scenario B2:
A1 with Min. Longline, B1 with Min.
Scenario A1: 10,000 MT  Trap, and 10,000 MT
All Gears Catch Remainder Catch
Total net 937 741 3,040 2,790
  present value
  (mill. US$)
Moratorium 10ª n.a. [13, 3, 4] n.a.
  period (years)
Optimal 499,510– 499,040– 811,130 807,360
  steady-state 800,000b 800,000b
  stock (tonnes)
Optimal 55,000 55,000 [35,000; [35,000;
  steady-state 10,000; 5,000] 10,000; 5,000]
  harvestc (tonnes)
Notes: n.a. = not applicable.
a Moratorium from years 1 to 10, 23 to 28, and 41 to 46.
b Stock levels during the last (lower stock level) and the first year of the fishing period, respectively.
c Harvest levels are rounded off to the nearest 1,000 tonnes.
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The stock and catch follow the pattern shown in figure 5. When longline enters
the fishery after the moratorium, the stock has reached a level of 860,000 tonnes.
The subsequent development of the fishery is very interesting. After 25 years,
catches of longline are reduced to 30,000 tonnes and then to an annual catch of
16,000 tonnes for three years, before increasing again to 35,000 tonnes. Catches are
again reduced during years 35–37. The catches of trap and remainder, on the other
hand, always remain at their steady-state levels. Gradually, the stock approaches
811,000 tonnes, which can be considered the steady-state stock level that maximises
the TNPV of the fishery.
Figure 4.  Stock Evolution in Scenarios A1 and A2 and Catch Evolution in Scenario A1
Figure 5.  Stock and Catch Evolution in Scenario B1
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As an alternative to scenarios A1 and B1, we imposed a constraint on each sce-
nario that catches in any given year may not be less than 10,000 tonnes. Results for
these alternatives—scenarios A2 and B2—are also given in table 2.
The same steady-state stock and harvest levels are achieved as for the main al-
ternatives, although the optimal stock level is approached more slowly (see figure 4
for scenario A2). Qualitatively speaking, the policies are similar to those of sce-
narios A1 and B1: pulse fishing for scenario A2, and non-constant annual catches
for scenario B2.
It is interesting to note that the gradual approach (A2 and B2) implies a reduc-
tion in TNPV of about 20% as compared to the optimal approach (A1 and B1).
However, the steady state is approached with a delay; i.e., st ady-state net revenues
are delayed as compared with the optimal approach. The tradeoff is, of course, influ-
enced by the discount rate.
All four scenarios have also been investigated under the assumption of a 10%
discount rate (table 3). The higher discount rate is seen to cause very substantial re-
ductions in the TNPVss of the various scenarios as compared with the initial case.
Scenarios A1 and B1 involve marginally shorter moratorium periods than in the case
of a 4% discount rate. Nevertheless, the moratorium periods are still substantial, and
with a higher discount rate, this has a profound effect on TNPV. On the other hand,
steady-state stock and harvest levels are not affected much, and policies are qualita-
tively similar to those for the lower discount rate.
Policy Implications
As a highly migratory fish stock, the East Atlantic bluefin tuna is to be managed by
an RFMO (UN 1995; Munro 1999; Bjørndal and Munro 2003). The RFMO entrusted
with this responsibility will be faced with daunting tasks in terms of formulating and
imposing policies on the participants of the fishery, as well as enforcing them. The
Table 3
Comparison of Alternative Management Scenarios —10% Discount Rate
Scenario A2: Scenario B1: Scenario B2:
A1 with Min. Long line, B1 with Min.
Scenario A1: 10,000 MT Trap, and 10,000 MT
All Gears Catch Remainder Catch
Total net 284 151 960 774
  present value
  (mill. US$)
Moratorium 9 n.a. [11,3,3] n.a.
  period (years)
Optimal 519,090 475,720 805,360 805,400
  steady-state
  stock (tonnes)
Optimal 55,000 55,000 [35,000; [35,000;
  steady-state 10,000; 5,000] 10,000; 5,000]
  harvest (tonnes)
n.a. = not applicable.
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fact that a large number of countries participate in the fishery makes it difficult to
arrive at a cooperative solution. This is the case even if some “natural” coalitions
can be developed; e.g., between European countries that are EU-members or
DWFNs (Costa Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 2000). Moreover, the stability of the
solution can be questioned (Brasão, Costa-Duarte, and Cunha-e-Sá 2000). Finally, as
we are dealing with an extremely valuable stock migrating over vast areas of ocean,
the new member problem takes on special significance (Kaitala and Munro 1997;
Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 2001).
Despite these problems, the empirical analysis has resulted in a number of
novel, interesting results with important consequences for an RFMO. First, for the
various scenarios, the optimal stock level varies between roughly 500–800,000
tonnes.10 This compares with a stock level of 150,000 tonnes in 2000. In other
words, there is a very strong case for rebuilding the stock. The costs of not institut-
ing a recovery programme are very substantial in terms of foregone economic rents.
Moreover, the sustainability of the stock is threatened unless a recovery programme
is implemented.
It should be noted that purse seine is one of the gears that is eliminated as part
of an optimal gear structure. Purse seine is currently the most important gear type.
However, it has lower selectivity than any of the other gear types (table A3). Thus,
from an ecological point of view, there are also arguments for eliminating this tech-
nology.
Second, to rebuild the stock, Draconian measures are called for: either outright
moratoria over fairly lengthy periods, or possibly a more gradual approach to steady
state given by a TAC at a low level for an extended period of time.
Third, the cost of inefficient gear structure is very high indeed.11 The cost of
maintaining the current gear structure (scenario A1) involves a very substantial loss
in net present value compared with the optimal structure (scenario B1), regardless of
the rate of discount. Also, the optimal policy (B1) calls for the elimination of certain
gear types. Comparable results were found by Bertignac et al. (2000), who analyse
the management of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, and Southern albacore tuna in the
Pacific Ocean. These stocks are harvested by a number of different gear types. The
authors found that the current fleet structure is suboptimal. To maximise rents, cer-
tain gear types should be virtually eliminated, while the effort of remaining gear
types should be reduced substantially. Martinez-Garmendia and Anderson (2005)
found similar results for the West Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, calling for the
elimination of inefficient gear types in order to maximise rents.
Fourth, generally speaking, non-constant policies are called for. Scenario A1
calls for pulse fishing with a 13-year fishing period followed by a five-year morato-
rium. Scenario B1 results in a “milder” form of pulse fishing, where there are
periods with reduced harvests for longline, while the harvests of trap and remainder
are maintained at their sustainable levels. The qualitative difference between these
two scenarios is due to the fact that the current gear structure is imposed on scenario
A1.
Kennedy (1992), using a multi-cohort bioeconomic model to analyse the west-
ern mackerel fishery, also found pulse fishing to be optimal. However, Kennedy also
explicitly modelled adjustment costs for fishing effort and found that they dimin-
ished the advantage of pulse fishing as compared to strategies that allowed for
10 The lower level is the stock level in the last year of the fishing period, cf. tables 2 and 3, scenarios A1
and A2. The average stock level is substantially higher.
11 Here, only efficiency in the bluefin tuna fishery is considered. If what is herein an inefficient gear
type also participates in other fisheries, it may be efficient over its entire application of effort.
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positive harvesting in all periods. In our context, adjustment costs would mean that
the difference in TNPV between strategies A1 and A2/B1 and B2 would be less than
those in tables 2 and 3.
In a fishery where price is dependent on quantity, an optimal policy will often
involve some harvest even if the stock is low in order to take advantage of the high
price. On the other hand, as stock increases, increasing catches will be constrained
by the declining price (Grafton, Sandal, and Steinshamn 2000). In our analysis,
price is assumed constant. Qualitatively, however, the high profitability of trap plays
a role somewhat similar to that of a quantity-dependent price: in scenario B1, the
initial moratorium for trap is very brief, only three years, despite the fact that the
initial stock is very depleted. Furthermore, while catches of longline are reduced in
later years, those of trap are always maintained at their maximum level due to the
high profitability of this gear. This point has not previously been made in the litera-
ture.
On the one hand, we have seen that the optimal policy for the bluefin tuna fish-
ery is to shut down some of the existing gear types, namely bait boat and purse
seine, and, on the other hand, to declare a temporary harvest moratorium. Shutting
down gear types that have been active for a long time may lead to social costs, as it
will impose a loss on the fishermen involved. A moratorium may also lead to the
exit of a number of fishermen. Moreover, as the moratorium periods are different for
each gear type, those excluded from the fishery or with a long moratorium may have
incentives to harvest using gear types with shorter moratorium periods.
Policy recommendations on the bluefin tuna fishery require that all these issues
be taken into account. Sooner rather than later, if nothing is done the stock will be
reduced to such low levels that the sustainability of the fishery is threatened. Only
Draconian measures will guarantee the long-term sustainability of the stock and the
fishery.
The East Atlantic bluefin tuna is an example of a highly migratory fish stock
facing severe overexploitation. Yet, several countries continue to harvest this spe-
cies, while others consider entering the fishery because of its high market value.
Thus, the maintenance of these recommendations requires cooperation among all the
countries involved in the fishery through the RFMO, as well as strict monitoring and
enforcement.
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Appendix: Model of Population Dynamics
All symbols are defined in table A1. The model of population dynamics, from
Kirkwood and Barry (1997), is described in equations (A1) through (A11).
Population Numbers
Equation (A1) gives the initial numbers of fish per age. Equation (A2) is the recruit-
ment function. A bilateral recruitment function is specified. Equations (A3) and
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(A4) are the number of fish per year as a function of fishing mortality and natural
mortality. Equation (A3) concerns ages 1 until 9, and equation (A4) represents the
number of fish at ages 10 and over. Equation (A5) is the spawning stock biomass as
a function of the maturity rate, the number of fish, and the average weight by age.
Finally, equation (A6) is the total biomass level by year.
N0,a = a˜ N   for 1 £ a £ A (A1)
Nt,0 = f (SSBt- ) =
Rmaxe
d  if St- 1 ³ SSBmin
Rmax
St- 1
SSBmin
ed  if St- 1 < SSBmin
ì 
í 
ï 
î 
ï 
(A2)
Nt,a = Nt- 1,a- 1e
- M a- 1 - F t - 1,a - 1     for   a = 1,2,. . . ,9 ; t = 1,2, . . . (A3)
Nt,A = Nt- 1,9e
- M 9 - F t - 1,9 + Nt- 1, Ae
- M A - F t- 1,A (A4)
SSBt = Matt,aNt,aWt,a
a= 1
A
å (A5)
Bt = Nt,aWt,a
a= 1
A
å . (A6)
Catch at Age and Gear
Equations (A7) through (A11) relate to catch by gear. Equation (A7) is the instanta-
neous fishing mortality by year, age, and gear as a function of the fishing mortality
at maximum selectivity, and selectivity. Equation (A8) is the fishing mortality by
year and age. Equation (A9) is the catch numbers as a function of fishing mortality,
the number of fish, and natural mortality. Equation (10) is catch in weight in period t
for gear s.
Ft,a,s = FMaxt,s.Sela,s (A7)
Ft,a = FMaxt,s.Sela,s
s= 1
S
å (A8)
CNt,a,s =
Ft,a,s.Nt,a
(Ft,a,s + Ma )
s= 1
S
å
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ç 
ç 
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Running the Model
Stock numbers in 1995 represent the starting point for the various analyses per-
formed.
Table A1
Definition of Symbols
Variables Coefficients
N Nº of fish (beginning of year) M Instantaneous natural mortality
Ñ Estimated nº fish (beginning of 1995)Mat Maturity rate
SSB Spawning stock biomass W Average weight
F Instantaneous fishing mortality q Production function parameter
FMax Fishing mort. at maximum selectivitya Catch-stock elasticity
B Total biomass cs Cost per unit effort
Sel Selectivity g Crew share
CN Catch numbers R Interest rate
E Effort d Instantaneous growth rate
C Catch
Rev Revenue Indices
Cost Cost
P Average price T Time (t = 1,…,T), T=60 (2056)
P Profit a Age (a = 1,…,A), A=10+
TNPV Total net present value s Gear (s = 1,2,…,S)
Rmax Scaling parameter
St-1 Stock at period t – 1
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Table A3
Selectivity by Gear (Rows) and Age (Columns)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Longline 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.51 1
Purse Seine 0.36 1 0.92 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.53
Baitboat 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.32 0.47 1
Trap 0.92 1 0.46 0.26 0.18 0.1 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
Remainder 0.28 0 0.08 0 0 0.06 0 0.96 0.51 1
Table A2
Model Parameters
Variables Values
Recruitment Function
Rmax (number of fish) 1,572,724
SSBMin 8.01 E7
d 0.113
Production Function
Biomass in the base year 149,651.15 tonnes
Initial Conditions
Average weight by age [5.3; 11.8; 19.3; 33.3; 51.8; 74.5; 95.3;
121.6; 145.5; 245.1]
Number of fish by age [1,572,724; 1,016,007.65; 385,195.51;
403,719.36; 533,995; 190,799; 166,737;
116,904; 26,341; 100,694]
Fishing mortality at maximum selectivity
(LL, PS, BB, Trap, Rem) [0.3353; 0.3645; 0.0487; 0.1207; 0.1141]
Effort in 1995 [9,294; 2,114; 2,066; 2,274; 21,510]
( LL, PS, BB, Trap, Rem)
Catches in 1995, MT [12,849; 17,689; 1,858; 3,277; 4,352]
( LL, PS, BB, Trap, Rem)
Source: Kirkwood and Barry (1997).
